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FARRAR & RlNE;HART, INC. 
NEW YORK MIUINM 
IN TIUS PAWH~ET, the Germany of today is con- 
trasted with the Germany of the days before World 
War 1. It is the contrast of Germany under the 
Hohcnzollern and Germany under Hitler, and the 
substance of th is  contrast is the loss a£ liberty and 
freedom in virtudly every aspect of ~ u b l i c  and pri- 
vate life. 
# * *  
When America entered the last World War, Dr. 
Ahnm E. Taylor visited the countries of the Allied 
and Associatad Powers as a member of the House 
Mission. Subsequently, as a mernbtr of the War 
Trade Board, he represented the United State on 
questions of the food supply of the Allied and neu- 
tral countria as well as of the Central Powers, He 
was a member of the Americrn delegation to the 
International h n o m i c  Conference in 1927 aad is 
now director of research at General Mills, Inc. Dr. 
Taylor is the author of many technical and popular 
writings. 
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GERMANY THEN AND NOW 
I N discussing chc objectives of the pwcnt war, social and tconomic, the natural comparison is k w ~ n  demouacy 
and che ideology of the Nazi government of Germany. W e  
may accept ourselvs as "democratic," since Hitler has de- 
nounced us for democracy, and be has vied to difftrentiatc 
Americans of German stmk from other Americans. Perhaps 
equally significant is the difference between the Gummy of 
t d a y  and the Germany of an earlier period. There must Ix 
thowands of Americans still living who studied in Germany 
in the quarter century kforc the World War; most of t h e  
Americans look back on their student days with plcarurr and 
appreciation, certainly with grati tudc and possibly with m e t -  
ence. Studutrs of painting a d  scui urc went mostly to 
France, Italy, and Greece; students o I" music preferrad Get- 
many. Students of the sciences went m d y  to Germany, a 
circumstance due partly to facilities of instruction but due also 
to the indiffercnct toward foreign students then mmnt in the 
universities of Great Britain and France. The writer entered 
a German university in r e ,  and during the following two 
decades enjoyed long and frequcnt visits there. He was at- 
tached to the American Embassy in Berlin in a tachnical capa- 
city in 1916; he later surveyed the nutritional conditions in 
Germany and Central Europe foliowing the war; and he has 
since visit& Germany several times, the last time in 1937. 
Without going into details or scatistical appraisals, the convast 
btcwecn G m y  under Hitler and Gumany under the 
HohcneolIerns is marked - perhaps more marked than the 
mntrast in any other country, with the exception of Russia 
and Turkey, within a puiod of a half century. Bctwccn 1 8 p  
and 1940, Germany, Russia, and Turkey, for different r t a ~ ~ m ,  
passed through internal revolutions, with changcs so extensive 
and intensive as deeply to alter the social stmawe. These 
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contrasts in Germany can be stated undu s e e d  headings. 
Germany before the World War had a rigid system of pre- 
liminary education (the Gymnasium) with a k i b l c  system 
of university education. 7 % ~  student was supposed to know 
what be wished to study in the University. In thr routine con- 
duct of university education in Germany, which had dtvel- 
"p" d i d y  from M o m  in smdl political units, students c ectd a major and two minor subjects. Work in the major 
subject mended from three to four years, including inteo- 
sive theoretical and practid applications; the final examina- 
tion in the major subject was hard, but the thcgis was st i l l  
more important. One minor subject was usually related to thc 
major subject - thus, a major in chemistry was often accom- 
p i a d  by a minor in physics. The work in the first minor 
rubjcct was relatively intensive and usually had a bmring on 
the major subject, but did not lead to a thesis. The second 
minor subject was usually philosophy; it was d i 6 d t  in some 
universities and easy in others, according to the redilaaiom 
of individual teachers. A student could sclcct tcac !I ers and the 
length of puiod of i n s t d o n ;  be could move from one uni- 
versity to another, receiving creht for work previously done. 
Expeascs wwc tow and mroiltd students enjoyed various 
extraarridar privileges. The &ency of this system of edu- 
cation was duc not merely to f d r n  of election and dtction 
and to high standards, but &o to fradom of insmaion. 
ft  is a s y  at a distance and over the years to tlMggcrate the 
&al side d studtat life - the Kommc~se, the Korpr. the 
walking wurs and the unconventional simplicities of custom. 
Under this system of education, a considerable numbtr of con- 
vivial students wasted £ram three to five years; a relativd 
luge nvmtm worked to Jome pmma~ advantage; n rmal; 
number utilized the opportunities to thc fullest and became the 
intellectual I&s of Gumany, generation after peration. 
Ah, many foreign students mid back to their cwnviw the 
torches of Gtrmaa science and art. In the ninetics Gcrmany 
was a Mecca for music lovers, with a profusion of opuas and 
concerts at low prices of admission. Amuiws occupied much 
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more than their share of the scats, but I never heard a German 
rcscnt it. Nor were wc reprohtcd for being "democratic." 
The recruiting of the teaching staff was donc under a mm- 
petitivc system, in effect. Aftcr aa ambitious German student 
had taken his daaorate, he continued i n k v c  spacidized 
work for several ytars. H c  then offered h M f  as an instruc- 
tor, a s ~ a l l t d  Pri~oc Do~cnr; upon being accepted by the 
h d t y  he bacamc a full-&dgd teacher. Promotion would 
lead to what c a r r c ~ p d e d  to an associate professorship; a final 
promotion to full profwsorship. The Dozcntm and prof~ssors 
ofired courses for which students paid fecs, which went to 
the teachers themselves in large part; dl corn@ openly for 
the favor of students and in the development of their subjects. 
This fmdom fraqucndy led to violent polernics between men 
in d i k t  universities and indeed betweea colleagues on the 
same faculty; but freedom it was, exceeded in few American 
universities, all the more tKcausc the Rtctors changed every 
year and did not serve long turns, as do presidmts of Amer- 
ican universities. 
Thc German university of today is a totally changed insti- 
tution. On paper, in the institutions still remaining open 
(there were once nearly thirty in the regions now indudcd 
in the RJch) students f d o w  the same routine. But freedom 
of appointment, promotion, and reaching has becn withdrawn. 
A young man now desirous of homing a Dozcnt must not 
d y  q d i f  y in his specialty, he must also qudify in political 
ideology; in fact he must pass an examhation in the Nazi 
theory of the state. He must qualify in totalitarian -t. 
There is high-grade mearch still king donc in German uni- 
vvsitics d a y ;  but the systm of recruiting incoming tcachus 
has bttn subordinated to political management by Ehe govern- 
ment. It is sometimes suggested that appointments to teachihg 
staffs in state universities in the United States are under poli- 
tical influence; but if this is so, it is local and personal and not 
ideological. There is no experience in American history which 
can h compared with the changes of German educational 
management under the Nazi government. There can bt no 
uestion of the extreme change within thc hall etnnvy in the 
Bi-ion of loss of frmiom by lea&= and nudenu. Univer- 
sitics in the oc~upicd countries are little betccr off. 
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Wight of M y ,  spsceh, prcrl, and Mwemtat 
Under the Hohcnzollcrn dgime in Germany, t h e  rights 
were accorded with almost cht same frecdom and implications 
as in the United States or Grcat Britain. There was such a 
tbing as last majcsfl; but it applied especially to the person of 
the Crown, and not to the institutions of the state. The writer 
bas heard public politiml harangues in Germany as violent as 
thoM ia Hydc Park in London, In the nineties, the cult of 
socialism was quite fashionable; but cvur the strongat op 
ponmts of sadism were loath to lay hand upon frccdom of 
p m 9  s p c h ,  or a%ernHy. Mail was not censored. Thue were, 
of course, instanca of ndusion-Karl Marx left G c m p  to 
compose his works in the security and dusion of England. 
Foreigners rcsidcnt in Gumany possessed unusua! freedom, 
unhampered by more than nominal registration with the 
police. Germans moved a b u t  with freedom, from one state 
to another and from one occupation to another; tht Wan&- 
lust was unratrainad, of which the emigration of vcnturc- 
some millions furnished ample illustration. 
In the present Germany, there is no right of free assembly, 
fm speech, free press, or of free movement. Criticism by 
speech is severely punished; even listening to a foreign radio 
broadcast is forbidden. Mail is censored. The pms is noi only 
wnuolkd, it is literally edited from a mntral bureau. Public 
m b l a g e  is unknown, except whcn &ally calkd for thc 
purpose of prearranged approval of the government Move- 
ment from one part of the country to another, or even from 
one vocation to another, is not a permitted right; emigration 
is under control, and limited mostly to dcsplcd Jms. Since 
inhabitants are economic units, they are resvaintd like bills 
of exchange. Censorship exists to the length of complctc sup 
prcssion of freedom of public expression - or private txprce 
sion as controlled by the * tap,  the sEEm police. It is true 
that the present miriaions a& more severe dince declaration 
of war in Scptunber 1939 than previously; but fmdoms en- 
joyed prior to the World War were withdrawn by the Nazi 
dgirnc as m as it tmk power, five years before the dedara- 
tion of the present war. The beam of the liberals of Ger- 
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many - republican govunment under the formality of mon- 
archy - has k n  s h a d .  
More important today' than the printed pa& is the spdr ta  
word, iu broad-. Amuimns, howmu, must bear in mind 
that e o n  of receiving instruments is very much more 'F 
common in the United Stat= than in any European country; 
&&re, che radio as an instrument of propaganda and dis- 
seminator of news and public opinion is here more pramincot 
than in Europt. It is fair to say that at pmcnt in t& United 
Statcs the bmdcastcd word has more oublic influam than 
the printed page; but the oppsik is vul in Germnny. Nevw- 
thdms, on account of the elusiveness of the broadcastcd ward. 
and the possibility of dmlatiw by eollcctian of private 
audientcg (so to spk) the radio is of large importance in 
Europe. At the same h e ,  no German listens to Hider as 
casually as many of us listen to the Fircsidc Chats; and no 
member of the American Congress or cabinet is accordtd the 
attention given to a member of the E l i ~  of the Nazi p r t y .  
Thcre is n Jther frm broadcast nor fra mciving in Garmany, 
nor is there in Russia or Italy, In Germany, a mega& Eng- 
lishman regularly broadcasts to Great Britain in the English 
language, counting on freedom of reception in Great Britain; 
but the use of receivers to pick up broadcasts from foreign 
cwntrics is prohibited in Germany. Thut are ofticially con- 
ducted broadcasts in Germany, dealing with war news and 
propapda  and especially directed to the small powers sur- 
rwndlng Germany. The Guman government even fears in- 
filtrations from neutral Sweden and Switzerland, since press 
reports and broadcasts in those cwntrics have been protc8eed 
when deemed inimical to Gcnnany. Negative censorship is 
bad, but directed propaganda is worse. Since Germans cannw 
know how outsiders regard their government, they art un- 
able to realize the outside feeling - that the prcsmt German 
government is n recession f m  political civilization. 
The Germans are a highly cultivated race, praaically with- 
out illiteracy; the Russians are an ignorant race with a high 
percentage of illituacy. But the samt fact holds, that no one 
in the outside world can know what the people in Germany 
and in Russia redly  think about their own affairs or their 
relations with the outside world. Thus, dection is impsible. 
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Germany under the Hohcnzollerns enjoyed an active politi- 
cal life. The conservative party was opposed by the often 
larger "proletarian" prtics - h a 1  democrats and d c d  
liberals. The Catholic prty (the Centnun) had the most sta- 
tionary representation in the Rcichstag, and s u p p o d  lmth 
conservatives and IihraIs on occasion. The several parties had 
their political sheets, which in editorids and in hmdlincs 
demonstrated freedom of proposal and criticism. There was 
freedom of political parties in the Rcichstag and active oppi -  
tion in debate. One of the treats in Berlin in the last century 
was to listen to attacks on Bismarck by liberals like Virchow 
and Richter. 
Today the tntirt press of Germany is negatively controlled 
by the police a d  pit ivc ly  directed by a propaganda bureau 
of the government. Newspapers arc literally billboardp; cu- 
tain papers are dose to Hider and Gotring, others to von 
Ribkntrop and Ha; apparently von Schacht has no p m  
and makes his own noise. In any event, them is no indc 
pendent editorial criticism; nor is them independent publica- 
tion of news, since all news is given out or censored by the 
political bureau. This situation is equalled only in Russia, 
since even in Italy and Japan there are said to be traces of an 
independent press left. When one considus the vigor, indc- 
ptndence, and dent  that used to adorn the issues of the 
Berliner TugcbIaH and the Frankjurter ZCit~ng for exampIc, 
the degradation of the press under the Nazi system becomes 
glaring. There can be no plitical freedom without a free 
pms, and no free press without political freedom - and in 
the present Germany (wen before the war) both have been 
extinguished. In short, there can be no freedom far Germany 
without freedom for Germans, which has been lost. 
One of the aversions of Hitler s e a s  to bt that in the United 
Stam immigrants live in a "melting-pot: whereby a common 
typc of "American" is turned out in the second generation. 
HitIer dislikes Amcrica became he fears this country may try 
to democratize the outside world; he dislikes us also because 
this country has drmocratid millions of Germans who since 
the Civil War have migrated to and settled in this country, 
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and who with their descendants are loyal and integrated mrm- 
btrs of our A c t y .  C h c  to ten million Americans have Ger- 
man M d ,  on which Hider would like to count for eventual 
support for his "new order" in Europe, - the policy that a 
race is to bE made into a nation, not a nation made from the 
mingling of races. But our  immigrant^ were "high-graded." 
Mass migration rather than assimilation is the Nazi rule. 
In Germany under the Hohenzollcms, workers had the 
right to organize: thcy could strike and make contraca with 
cmploycrs covering wa and conditions of work. Workus 
could alx, form p o l ~ t ~  . k r  parties. In some respects, workers at 
that time were as w d  o r g a n i d  in Germany as in Great 
Britain and in many ways better organized than in the United 
Statcs. Workers' organizations in Germany were in dose can- 
tact with those in the surrounding industrialized countries, 
and had close international connections. Germany was then an 
importer of seasonal labor, especially farm workcrs; rhcse 
migrations were under Local rather than fcdual wntrol. To an 
extent greater than in Great Britain, urban workers were 
adherents of socialism, and the poIicies of Bismarck t o k  ac- 
count of this circumstance. 
Under the Nazi system, lab has lost freedom; labor 
unions ate closed and political afiiliations abolished. There is 
no right of collective hgaining; w a p  arc set by the govern- 
ment, to some extent under the inAuenct of industrial leaders. 
The h o u r  "Labor Front" of Ley, very c f f d v t  for loyal 
adherents, has for others h e  same latitude shown to the 
members of a chain-gang on outside prison work. Migration 
of Iabor into and out of Germany is undcr federal state contrd 
and regulated by force. This dm holds fax the imprisoned 
state, who have lost their own and German hccdan. 
Thus, a half century of "class struggle" by workmen for 
independence and organization has bccn crastd. Pwibly n- 
where in the world, even in Russia, arc workers more con- 
trolled in r a p t  to hours, wages, movuncnt, and type of 
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work--since it is a fundamental doctrine thatthere is no divid- 
ing lm ktwem dviEan and military vocations. H w d h -  
d a f t ,  Wckrwirtsch~t and Kricgm'r~~tkaj t  are +ad in 
time and space, i n t c p t d  by the state. The mistake was ma& 
in the beginning of Italian and Gcnnan concentration d 
acmromic powu, of assuming that it was anti-labor; it has 
since h e  dear that the changs wcre both anti-labor and 
mti-upid - not anti-Mshevic but pdictator. Worktro' 
syndicates pusist in Italy, however. 
Under the Hoheodtrn dgime in Gemany, capital was 
in most rcspaas as free in initiative as in Great Britain and 
France, at a time when we dmdy bad laws designed to 
maintain "competition" by prohibiting ''conspiracy in rt- 
straint of trade." Capitalists in Germany were permitted wide 
latitude, which found t x p i o n  q c c d y  in a d s ,  somt 
internal but many international. It was alleged on behdf of 
capital that workers' danaods provoked organidon of in- 
dustrialists, while on the & hand it was alleged that wn- 
cmtration of industrialists made organization of w o r k s  
-tial; but in m y  event, freedom of organization cxistcd on 
both sides. Thut was a nominal c o n l  by thc state, cspaidy 
in mpct of international d s .  Under this system of free 
eaarprise, German industrialists and banks uadbd in many 
distant countries, where the combination of quality of mcr- 
&andisc and long-term credits was effective in stcuring far- 
tip &, especially for new lines of goods. In the laa twen- 
ti* German industrialists came to this country to look u 
our "new UP.** They f w d  much to I- in mass pi S 
tion, but not in distribution. That Amerians would makc 
loam to Gumans to cum out goods to corn c with o w ,  
never lou for them the spell of Alice in WonGand. 
At presmt, capital is in drains in Germany. Many of the 
ca 'dim have disappred. Jewish capitalists have ather 
or ate i. concenmrioa amp; but mnog pure- 
bloodad German cppitalists, Pkt Thysen, have left Gtrmaay. 
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It is commonly stated that tht "stcel magnat-" originally sup 
p o d  Hitltr to ust him against labor unions -only later to 
k ahsorbed by thc totalitarian government. But in any event, 
the government now &ermina USES of tapid, rat- of inter- 
at and dividends, profits, and the type of w c ~ k  to which 
capital is applied. In foreign trade, the previous free export of 
Gtnnan 4 s  and services is now entirely under governmatt 
bumus. In controt of foreign exchange and physical movc- 
rnent into forcign trade, the government possessed a power not 
known prior to t k  World War. 
Just what have been the monetary gains and l o w  d 
workers of labor and of capita1 rcspmtivdy, is not dear; 
apparently, labor has obtained security at a lowm income 
level whik capital has obtained security by splitting profits 
with the state. But in any event, freedom of capita! has dis- 
appeared, just as has frtadorn of labor; and, therewith, con- 
flict bccween capital and labor. Maax has been vindicated 
negatively. Whcntver a decision has been made by the rapon- 
sible (and iafallible) prty  ltadcrs, this is accepted as ex 
cathedra by investors and workers - just as it w a s  in the 
building of missions in California by native Indian labor 
under the Spanish padres. Profits b e  savings for the state. 
Control of lahr and capital means control of gmda and 
services and thcir prices, and of coum control of the standard 
and plane of living. Whenever Gumans inquire why thcy 
have a lower plane of living, thc status is fim txtcnuated as 
"exaggeration based on pmonccived standards"; then they art 
told that they arc "ptponing consumption from the present 
to the future"; that the policy makes Getmans secure - in 
part through making non-Gumans instcure. T h e  diet, cloth- 
ing, and household hrnishings of Germany contain surpris- 
ing amounts of E~SBCI -which has had the inevitable effect 
of introducing Ersaz into commercial morality. In any went, 
the Germans are d d  that whatever the plan of living (cleverly 
devised), this is applied evenly to all, whereas (aver and over 
again are quoted the words of our President) in the United 
Stam onerhird of the population is underfed, undtrdothed, 
and undcrhwsd. 
The final test of the Nazi system Iics in foreign trade; the 
field of foreign markets wilI be the Armageddon of the 
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struggle btcwecn totalitarian and demoeratic governments. 
Here the Germans have ftlt forced to Imve their traditional 
vantageground of technical cxaeIlencc of products and have 
attempted a revolution in international finance. This has ken 
done through c o n d  of value of German money, rat= of 
foreign exchange, bartu under "daring agrmnmts," and 
fixing of import and urpon prices without reference to cats. 
A dear view of contrast betwetn foreign trade by govc~nment 
and foreign tradc by private enterprise may be had by com- 
paring an authoritative German book by M q e r  on Andysis 
of Exchange Resm'ctions Prcrcnt in I;otce with W d d  
Economy i~ Transirion by Staky, and Rcconsrwion of 
Wwld Trade by Condlifie. In the perusal of such literature it 
is to be kept in mind that any sysfcm adopted for foreign 
tradc reversibly involve domestic mdc and tends to become 
one of the determinants thereof. When Geman writers speak 
of the "new order," they include in this program, as perhap 
the most important single element, the control of foreign tradc 
by smtt planning, instead of dcvdoprnent of foreign market- 
ing by privare enterprise. Aim, in the "new order" are various 
impitions on imparting states, to be appIied through onc or 
anather form of terrorism by totalitarian states, as has been 
done in Eastern Europe in recent prewar p r s .  
in the tactics of totalitarian strategy, force begins where 
economic rcssure fails; seizure of country is made when 
necessary ! or control. Having seized Norway and Denmark, 
Hitler may feel ht is dI on the way of attaining a pet (ver- 
bal) ambition of Bismarck to unite Scandinavia with Ger- 
many to form "a league strong enough to rule the whole 
world." 
In Germany under the Hohcnzollems, the various political 
units of population had ekient police s y s t e m s  of the d d a  
type, for maintenance of public order and suppression of 
crimc, not political direction of the populace. Without qucs 
tion, the I m p d  Chancery had m e  sort of cspionap or- 
ganization, especially u& in forcign affairs, which some- 
timw was in evidence in controlling the spread of socialism. 
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But for che most part, &re tht World War, it cwld have 
been said fairly that the police system of Germany was as un- 
politid and honest as tbat of G m t  Britain, and both more 
capable and h w t  tban thost of France and the United 
States. At that time, only Russia bad a widcspmd systcm of 
secret police which had long served the Romanoffs. The h- 
dinavian countries and the other small muntrics around Ger- 
many did nut m a i n t a ~  such secret N ice  or forcign cspionagc. 
At ~ m m t  Germany has tht most elaborate dwdo~ment of 
sccmt'police ever knokn. The secret ict of the ~;lmanofFs 
was reorganized under h i n ,  and s" a h t c d  under Stalin; 
thus the OGPU had traditions. But the Gestapo of Germany 
is a new creation of thE Hitlcr d g h e .  I t  operates at home and 
abroad, puhaps even in the U n i d  Stam. A oct is thrown 
over the cntirc domcstic public, whose opinions, ucpressiams, 
and movements arc studied. If a German h e n s  to a broad- 
cast horn abroad, picks up a pampbl~ dropped by an English 
@me, or reads a foreign news per, this is set down in his P" record. The Gestapo checks aIl abor agitation, dl a t t u n p  at 
mival  of workers' unions. It arrangts for transfer of work- 
men, unla  this is done under uniformed militia. It is be- 
lieved that pressure has bten placed on German subjects, 
csptcidy Jews and other non-Tcutons, to influence relatives 
and financial connections in foreign co.mtrits. The &tap 
can place any one in a concentration camp, on suspicion and 
without trial. 
At prescot the Gwapo is almost as ubiquitous in Norway, 
Denmark, Wgium, Holland, France, Portugal, and Spain as 
it is in Germany. Indeed it might not be amiss to surmise that 
the Gestapo is secretly operating in Italy and Russia; and 
quite certainly it has rcprcscntativcs in the United Sratcs. The 
hand may be gloved, but not always. The psibility of so- 
d a d  "fifth column" movements d e p d s  upon e x d o n  of 
Gestapo influence into foreign countries. From the standpoint 
of rhe common man, this is prohably the greatest mtrast in 
Camany k w ~ n  the pmworld War and the present - the 
dative freedom from police interference then, and the mm- 
pietc wntrd by poIice now. The Ovra of Italy is dedasst. 
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Under this term is meant coaccatratioa in camps or uecu- 
tion of political opponents, Political assassination of owrse 
has always misted, of which a number of unique illustrations 
are given by Btrtrand Russell in his book Poww. But such 
assassinations wcre usually b e  by individuah or small 
groups, negatively rcvdutionary or positively patitical. Thus 
the assassination of Prince Ferdinand by a clique of Serbians 
started (the politicians into starting) the World War; later, a 
Czar of Russia was assassinated; alter the war, there were con- 
spicuous assassinations - of Kurt Eisncr, Rosa Luxrmburg, 
and Walther Rathenau. Such instances, however, were politi- 
cal assassinaticlos, not purges. 
The purge was ap rently organized in Russia, more for 
the p u r p  of "puriR:ng" the revolution y party in pwu 
than for the p u p  of r m v a l  of oppition outside of the 
revolutionary party. It has been perfected undcr Stalin, in 
some casts with the added public gesture of spectacular trial 
- bdorc hand-picked juries, with dcctcd charges-the 
prisoners pleading guilty in alitged conftssions which could 
hardly have hen spontaneous. Such trials have in &cct been 
a form of intellectual sadism, or possibly an occidental form of 
&are-&i. T h e  purges in Italy wcre occasional occurrcnaes, 
p h a p  under the doak of incendiariam, appareotly done far 
the purpc  of removal of opponents d fascism, rather than 
for the purification of the company of fascists. (It is probably 
over-simplification to assume that the word "purge" was 
drawn from the administration of eastoroil to political o p p -  
ents in the early days of Fascism in Idy . )  
Thc G m a n  purges, which began not Ion after Hitltr 
came to power, were apparently organized trot It for puriEica- 
tim of the Nazi party and for elimination of opposition out- 
side of the party. The Nazis did not copy the Russian prac 
ticcs of fake public trials; apparently that did not a p p l  to 
the dramatic instinct of Germans as it did to Russians, who 
had been (so to speak) raised on terror kids in popular 5c- 
tion. The number of persons who were informally extcuPcd 
in the purges in Germany is, of course, unknown. Purges in 
Balkan smtes have on occasions &en the form of mass sui- 
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ddc, "on recommendation;' like scppuka. For strategic rm- 
sons, pwges arc concentrated; thus for Germany, June 30, 
1934, was the Saint Bartholomew's Eve. 
A minor form of purge is the mnctntration camp, h these 
amps are herded all kinds of political opponents; of ~wrsc,  
also, racial undesirables and industrial obbtructionists. On oc- 
casions, obstreperous clergy are thus confined. To some extent 
the concentration camp is used as a sweating chambu, to 
=re information from exhausted inmates; to somt extent it 
is a farm of punishment, to last the life of the inmate. No 
previous public position or social status s&e to rtsetlc 
marked men from concentration camps, which contain some 
of the intellectual Itaders of pst-World-War Germany. 
The purge and the concentration camps arc mcrcly two in- 
struments of the Gestapo, whereby ttrrorism is disscminawd, 
political obcdimct exacted, and enforcement of economic 
policies facilitated,--GeitapI;tv, the new order of zht con- 
centration camps. 
It is impossible for an outsider to makc adequate comment 
on this phase of German Iifc. in Germany before the World 
War, Lutheran and Catholic churches stood side by side, 
relatively in peace and cosperation-all the more striking 
when one recalls that Luther amsc in Germany. In same Ger- 
man states, the Lutheran creed reprtscnted a state religion, in 
others the Catholic creed r t p m t e d  a state religim, in fact 
if a& by d m .  In any event, the religious Fife of the p p l e  
and the religious instruction of the growing generation were 
free from governmend restraint or dimtion throughout Gtr- 
m v .  
N ~ W  Germany has become irreligious in a sense totally 
foreign to that country. According to Rosaberg, the historical 
concept of "ntgauvc" Chrissianity is to lx changed into a 
" p i ~ v e "  Christianity of race, blood, soil, and Itader. Thc 
various organizations of youth, such as The Sumgth- 
Through-Joy movement, have both the design and tbc effect 
of removing adokents from the control of parents and 
churchcs. In this manner, Germany begins training in the 
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Nazi system in earIy chidhood; possibly it is this objdve ,  
rather than revolt against religion itself, that has led to 
the intransigent attitude toward established churches. Thc 
Lutherans, of course, are helpless; but the Catholics still have 
an cxtcrnd appeal to the Vatican and to Cathdic support 
over the world. When one recalh that for centuries Germans 
fought for che right to teach children a digion based on con- 
science, the present factual irreligion is indeed a striking 
change, This is a corporeal realization of a phrase of Glad- 
stone - "the negation of God erected into a system of govern- 
ment." As Max Eastman IM remarkd, "When historians 
look back, I Miwe the fading of religious faith in this era 
will seem a chid explanatory kctor of its madness." 
No- Oblige 
Whatever dse might have been said of the noble families 
which reigned over German states, ~ p c i a l l y  Prussia and 
Bavaria (me Prowrant, the ather Catholic), the fact r& 
that these aristocrats had high social breeding md superior 
personal instincts. NoMesse oblige was taught to successive 
gcncrations; since the king, prince, or duke was, for the most 
part, abmt the law, he was taught to have pride in acting in a 
manner worthy of such exemption. Thus, for a century lxfore 
the World War - from Frederick the Great to Kaiser Wil- 
hdm I -German rulers were leaders in cultural and social 
imprwunmts, though not always in the same sense leaders 
in political and emnomic ameliorations. In short, troblcssc 
obligc was the rule of action. Of this one hinds many historical 
illustrations, - a rather amusing one being the refusal of the 
King of Pruwia ta accept, as part of his domain, the Duchies 
d Schltswig-Holstein - conquered from Denmark by Prus- 
sia and Austria and off& to the king by Bismarck - be- 
cause "be had no right to them." 
Of n&cssc obligt in the leaders (elite) in National Social- 
ism ia Gcrmany, there is no outward sign. The attitude is one 
of intolerance, harshness, oppression, and cruelty. The terror- 
ism of the Gestapo extends down from the top; from the be- 
ginning, their actions have bEEn an outstanding expmsion of 
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Mein Kampf. When one contrasts the public lives of the 
members of the royal German h o w ,  with h e  public attitude 
of the icadcts of the Nazi dgimc, the difference between 
posxssion and lack of ~oblcsse obligr becomes apparent. 
According to early associa- of Hider, he dreamed 
forwards and backwards. Himself an Austrian (supposedly), 
from tfit history of the Hapburp he could have learned not 
Mtlity but intrigue. Having much of the spirit of the Carly 
Saxons, it may k inferred that he mites to himsdf the stories 
of Charlemsgne, Otto the Great, and Barbarma. He man- 
blcs neither King Frederick tbe Great nor Emperor Wilhdm 
lI. Most of all, in spirit if not in details, he rcstmblcs Gcnghis 
Kban. But one diffcrcncc seems dear: an economic Geaghis 
Khan is even mom ominous than a territorial Gmghis Khan. 
In the feudal age, subdivisions of population had geographi- 
ml origins; when the Germans emerged from the Middle 
A p ,  they a p p ~ d  as smdlcr "states," more or less inde- 
pendent, in surprising number considering the population in- 
volved. The advent of protestantism in North Germany had 
I some eEm in increasing such subdivisions. The history of the German-speaking peopl~s is one of variously-sought but never-attained cansolidation, until Hider. The Hapsburgs to the East and the Prussians to the North strove for mastcry; occasionally there appeared a South Gtmnie  movement. Surprising diflerenccs in language persisted in the different Gumanic units - stiI1 mist in vernaculars in fact - ex- 
aggerated by church di d: rcnccs. (Americans will recall dif- 
fercnces in constmetion and pronunciation in San Francko, 
New Orleans, Philadelphia, and Boston; also the variations in 
slm.9.) 
B~smarck iccrcated a German Empire in the nin.ct#n& 
rentury. He found that the so-called "War of Liberation" had 
accomplished nothing in the direction of unification. In his 
view German unity had been buried in the Federation at 
FranIdurt by Mettemich; h e  "movtmcnt of liberstion of 
1848" had mme to naught but rcformulariom of local in-. 
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- It was at this h e  that Bismarck m d e d  traits that have re- 
appeared in Hider. In an o&ial politid spmh as early as 
' 1851, he remarked: "The only gmd reason why a great smte 
goes to war is egotism and not romanticism, being thereby 
distinguished from a small srate." And once thereafter, Gut 
Prokesch-Osten, Premier at Vienna, remarked that "Herr v. 
Bismarck dadarts that Prussia i s  the center of the world" 
B i s m a ~ k  expanded Prussia by seizure northward, by conquest 
westward, and by consolidation centrally; eastward he sought 
an aliianm, but not absorption. Bismarck in 1866 provoked a 
war "without -on" against Austria {which he disliked). 
Ocfrated by supcrior military equipment, Auaria, in the form 
of the later Austria-Hungry, foIlowing the AusgICich in 1867, 
becvne the firm ally of Germany, - a  striking achievement 
of Bismarck. In the war with Austria, it turned out to k 
necessary for Prussia to oppose Bavaria, Saxony, and other 
small states and defeat them with Austria. Tbis defeat, how- 
ever, in a paradoxical manner, led to revival of Germanic con- 
sciousntss, so that when the FranaPrussian War was con- 
duded (another victory by supuior quipmem) with transfer 
of h e  and Lorraine to Germany, the German stam were 
u n i d  in an empire headed by the king of Prussia- in this 
sense a Pax Gcrmmica. The new Gumany concluded with 
the new Austria-Hungary an alliance which rcpmented by 
far the largest area and population ever under control by a 
Teutonic political power. Remarkable as was this poIitid 
consolidation by Bismarck, it n d s  to k kept in mind that it 
remained for Hider to absorb Austria and Bohemia, divide 
Poland for the nth time, and create a Westmsrk out of Ahcc-  
Lorraine. Abo, to imprison Norway, Denmark, Holland, and 
Bdgium. 
Befort thc World War, Gttmany contained wer twenty 
more or less autonomous political units, which had inherited 
and cultivated intra-racial antagonisms, usually petty but 
somctimcs deep. Thc main internal blocs were Pmssia, Sax- 
ony, Bavaria, Wurternkg and Badcn - usually Pntssia had 
to fact the combined oppition. Thae intra-German antaga- 
nisms were dearly, sometimes ludicrously, in evidence in the 
universiticr: the Schwabm were ridiculed, the Saxons mimick- 
ed, the Bavarians caricatured, the lowlanders reviled by tire 
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in-hvaria was Sau-pews. Everywhere was antagonism of 
che "Big Germans" by the "Lictle Germans." 
AII this Hider has changed. He absorbed the fragments of 
Austria-Hut kary, morselated by the trcatiw of pee. Ab 
sorbing Austria and Czcchoglovakia (as 'irrdcortd") into the 
Third Rcich, the Nazis proceeded to destroy ccnturidd 
particularism by erasing old state and provineid lints and 
dividing the country into administrative units called "Gau." 
Thus Hider did what neither Hapsburg nor Hohcndern had 
tried; he created a harsh national spirit out of many varietia 
of soft local spirits. Soon the dialects will disappear, since 
songs like "Worst W d  will not Ix sung in dialects. (Even 
Hitlcr has learned to speak high German, instead of an 
Austrian dialect.) Such a change had to lxgin with children; 
in another gemation, onIy grandparents will recall songs ~ n d  
stork in dialect and vcmacular. Problematical pcrhrps is tbe 
duration of Austrian absorption; though the Austrian Tyr* 
Icst are Iike tbost of Bavaria, Vienna r u n a h  a proud old city 
and the Prwsians may yet have to cxpcriaict a new meaning 
for the oId boast "Der Wicnm geht met untcr." In the light of 
a thousand years of history, this unification of spirit and gwg- 
raphy is the largest achievement of the Nazi dgime. It has, of 
course, no inherent comectim with the Nazi philosophy of 
state; but the fact remains that ody under this exttemc form 
of totalitarian statism was unikation accomplished. G e m m y  
was an Urvdk, had U r b l ~  and an Urspachc - the "Nordic 
unity" of race, blwd, language, and soil. Unpropagandal 
It is noteworthy that the greatest & d i n g  of art in the 
history of Germany -in Goahe and SchiIler, Mozart and 
&ahoven -was in a period of low political status of the 
German states. And rhe music dramas of Richard Wagner 
were completed mostly before the tstlblishmcnt of the Empire 
following the France-Pmian War. But tht philosophers of 
statism (Fichte, Hegel and N i e t d e ) ,  the historians of at- 
ism (von Treitschke, von Bemhardi, Rosenbcrg), and the 
planners of war (von Clauscwitz and von Schik&n) sprang 
from, and contributed to, the growth of the spirit and form 
- 
of the absolute smc. 
To understand Mcia Kampf, directly and in contrast, one 
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must have read The Ptiucc and the Disc~urses of Machiavelli, 
the Spir't of tkc Laws by Moatcsquitu, and the dispatches 
and writings of Mcttemich. That the untutored Hider knew 
thcsc works when he first wrote Mcin Kampf seems im- 
possible; but the same art of inmigut was there. The various 
historical shapes and sizes of lust for power have been assem- 
bled in a novd presentation in the P o w  of Btrtrand Russell. 
One wonders: when Hider reads The Prime and Mussolini 
reads M& Kampj, do they have the same thoughts? 
Before the World War, tht commercid and culturat d a -  
tions of Gumany to the other European countrim, outside d 
Russia, were on the whole bmcr than might have bcw ex- 
pacted from rcvious history. During this period Germany P w a s  technical y thc most rapidly advancing European coun- 
uy, with due rapact to many high points in ocher countries. 
Following rilgo through trains wcrc devdopcd and tourists 
vavdled with little delay, on passports that did not rquirc, 
outside of Russia, a gmt deal of information. (In any evcnt, 
brikry at frontiers was my.) Goods mwed freely, since im- 
port tariffa were practidy the only impediments to trade. In 
the commerce of Europe at this time comparative advantage 
was conspifilousIy the rule of action. The volume of inter- 
European foreign trade expanded in pmpwtion to total pro- 
duction. On the whole, d wages were rising, production 
costs falling, and fmd suppliw and raw materials from over- 
seas btcame avaihbie in increasing amounts. It was on this 
aceount that nm-political observers regretted the Bare-ups in 
international politics, which thrmtened to cut short a period 
of expanding &vclopmcnt, not scriouslg disturbed in the 'go's 
by he depression which was severe in tht United States. Cu- 
tainly over this quarter century, the attitude of Germany war 
"give and take" in matters of track, intercourse, cimtlatian of 
press, and freedom of forcign c x c ~ g c ,  
Relations with particular countries muit attention. Get- 
many had cordial political and commercial relatiom with the 
Scandinavian countries, which cwntrics had to a wnsidcrablc 
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extent @c&r technical dcvclopments. Thm defuweha 
countries received from Germany the s a m e  mnsidcratiw in 
commercial afFairs which they received from Great Britain 
and the United St-, with whom they traded frcdy. Quite 
similar were the rdarioas with Switxrhd,  Holland, and 
Belgium --countries that had highly devdoped mechard4 
techniques in metals and fibres. Thc fact that the Swiss, with 
three languagw, dcaIt freely and without pmure  with CW- 
many, France, and Italy, was regarded as ~lmahing merely 
natural and not an astonishing illustration of nciahborlincss. 
German trade with the E ~ S Z  including ~ussia,-&s largely 
an exchange of manufactured @ for agricultural rpw mlre- 
rials. But throughout this time, the grains and other p d u a  
of Eastem Europe and Russia competed with those from over- 
seas on a c i f .  basis of price and gmde. Certain grins fm 
the Black &a went by preference to England, others to France 
and Germany - for illustration, Frana and Gumany would 
accept wheat with admixtures of rye which was not desired in 
the United Kingdom. CMainly these Hinterland countries 
regarded themselves as indcpmdmt agricultural states, just as 
did - h a  and A w d i a .  
The trade relations with Britain, Frana, and Italy wcrc 
active, d d n g  h o m e r  the expanding development of tech- 
nology in Gmnany. Disregarding the Unitcd State thew 
four countries looked upon each other ar favored  custom^. 
It was in this pwiod that the words "Made in G m m n y "  
acquired inrunatimal currency, though much more used in 
new markets overseas than in the older mark& of Europe. 
The litical re!ationships theme comment. With the de- 
dine o P the influence of Bismarck and the incmse in i n h -  
cndt of vm Tirpitz and othcr advisers of Empew Wilhtlm 
Tl, occurred a shih in attitude towards Russia. The traditional 
opinion had been that friendship betwem Rwsia and Ger- 
many wss a " n a d  friendship!' The ruling hwses were 
friendly, by intermarriage and in d i c y .  Rwsia did not fear, 
nor did Germany then desire, expansion in the Ukraine; on 
the other hand, Gumany rook grim pfaure in the pros- 
of Russian pressure on British India via A f g h h m .  It was 
recognized that union of h m y  with Aubttia-Hunpry 
d hst in Guman eastern d i c v  and chat continuous & 
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mtion for Panslavism might disturb relations hvccn  Ger- 
many and Russia. If we interpm the murder of Prince Fraaz 
Ferdinand at Scrajevo as a misguided act of Panshvism, this 
ta r  turned out to be justified. Germany, while fully suppwt- 
ing Austria-Hungary in control of Serbian politid activity, 
then and since believed that the World War could have been 
prevented if the foreign ministers of Russia and Austria-Hun- 
gary had so desired. An alliance k t w e m  Russia and Francc 
was exptcted and meant little; but the success of Edward VII 
in inducing Great Britain to rooperate with this Alliance was 
a shock to Germany, since it indicated the end of the tradi- 
tional pdicy of friendship of Russia for Gumany. 
German relations with Italy were complacent but mn- 
descending. Germans did not like italirns and Italians dis- 
liked G e m s ,  as was evident in the behavior of touristp in 
both countries. Germany had no resptct for Italy as a military 
power on land or a naval power at sea. When Italy joined 
Germany and Ausuia in the Triple AUiancc, this was re- 
garded as something with a "nuisanct" value, since it re- 
lieved pressure MI Austria fmm the Adriatic, thus enabling 
Austria to devote morc attention to the Russian side. At the 
same time, it was commonly felt in Germany that if it came to 
a p r a l  war, the support of Itaiy could not be counted on, 
since obviously she stood to gain by trading with both sides. 
When, therefore, Italy entered the war against the Central 
Powus, and subsequently the contracts as mcaled in the 
Treaty of London wcre made public, no one in Germany was 
surprised. If one will take the press of Germany (a) in the 
'pb, { b )  at the outbreak of the World War, (c) following 
desertion of the Triple Aliiance by Italy, ( d )  during the peace 
negotiations, and ( c )  at present, thc contrast between the tone 
exhibited toward Italy now and previously is almost unbe 
licvable, - since to Italy is now ascrihd virtues in number 
and importance which then no German bclievd existed in 
Italians at all. 
The relations with France wcre naturally strained following 
her unexpectedly sudden defeat in 1871. To some went, of 
course, the Belgians were involved, since they were always 
regarded, men in treaties, as exposed to German invasion. 
The von SchIieffcn plan for attack on France by invasion of 
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3clgium was understd in wcll-informed Jrdes during the 
H o d  ktw- the Franco-Prussiaa and the WorId War; 
&&re, when Germany invadcd Belgium p r d y  with- 
out notice in rgq, no one was surprised. The Gemam b 
lieved that France would bi& her h e ,  as she had d m  re- 
p t e d l y  ovcr h e  centuries; the Fmch believed that mnc 
day thg would recapcure Alsace and larraine, and the statue 
of Suasbourg in Paris gave evidence of this abiding faith. In 
taking ovcr Ahwe and Lnrraine, Bismarck tried to s t c ~  all 
the iron-oie deposits; but ae~ocding to gossip, his g d o g h  
wcrc c d a ,  so that France was not entirely &privcd of h 
ore. Nevertheless, the possession of the h a h e  om, w 
gether with import from Spain and Sweden, alleviated grcatly 
the diliicultics of the Gcrman steel industry, dqmdent ~a 
low-percentage ort in Germany. 
The psscssion of donits by France, Holland, BeIgium, 
and Great Bri& gave them definite advantap in thdr 
trade with Germany, since munuis thus # vdw 
able supplies of many indispensabfe materials like tin and 
m b k .  
Politid relations between Germany and Grtat Britain had 
been on the whole free and cooperative since the Napo!conic 
wars, when together Prussia and England op@ Bonaparte. 
Up to the dose of the curtury it was Great Britain's policy to 
avoid long-term Continental commitments, in order to be free 
to act in one diraaioa or another in m e  of emergency. Britain 
had an old fear of Russia invading India through A f g h a h m .  
She had no fear of Gumany u d  the "large navy party" 
arose. Bctwtcn 18cp and 1915, a succcssiom of acts by Ger- 
many undermined the old relations. The Gumaa sup- of 
the Bars in the South African war, her ostcnmtiws su port 
1.f Spin in the war with the United States, together w i t  the 
behavior of her €k t  in Philippine waters, and the incident of 
Agadir were dearcut illuswtions. Impctlllism was c x p d -  
ing. Then arose motivated propaganda - D?a#g-n#ch~~tm,  
Berlin-Bagdad, Deutdhnd iibcr &s am M m ,  the continu- 
ous agitation ovcr rhc "unn&" donial poascssions of 
Grtat Britain and France (and Holland and Belgium , the 
p h a d o n  of h e  young lipLcr k t  "the htum 2-r- 
many li upon the water" -all these things, which sprang 
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not from the common p p i e  but from propaganda, were dis- 
turbing to statesmen in Great Britain. An alliance bawccn 
Russia and France was, of course, expected and had ao mean- 
'ing for the time being; when however, Britain became friend- 
ly to the Franeo-Russian alliance, this gave to the allianct an 
added import. At the same time, the Germans did not take 
British annoyance seriously, and at the opening of the World 
War it was not bdicvcd by the papulatian in Germany that 
England would declare war in support of Wgium. When 
this was done, it provoked the comment from the Wilhem- 
strassc, that so long as Europe had two war camps -Francs 
Russian and the Triple Alliance- with Great Britain de- 
mchcd, no general war could occur; but so s c ~ m  as Britain 
became anached to either side, general war became inevitable. 
The Germans resented the blockadc of foodstuHsfs, and this 
was always called the "English Starvation Plan." Each ex- 
tension of submarim warfare was portrayed as provoked by 
British violations of international law. The circumstance that 
a h  the entrance of the United States the AUied and Asso- 
ciated Powers rationed the neutral countries around Germany 
always provoked in Germans an in~omprehensiblt degree d 
rage. At the same time the Germans formally announcod the 
rule that 'hccessity knows no law." 
After the World War,- in what may be called the inter- 
war period, the t m t p  years from 1919 ta 1939 -trade con- 
ditions h n  Germany and her near and distant ncighbws 
changed significantly. This was duc t a r d y  to the develop. 
meat of "economic nationalism," to depreciations of cumn- 
cics, rcvaluarions and withdrawals of gold, control of foreign 
exchange and the gradual develo mtnt of barter. (It may not 
M ~ I  m rema* that during tgeK ume mag yeu. tnde 
restrictions at state borders devcloped in a significant number 
of the forty-eight states in the United States, rcstriclions un- 
heard of before the World War.) In these dwtlopmu1ts of 
economic nationalism and haner trade, minority prtssures 
within countries and weight of numbers bet- countries 
became ominous. Evcn W o e  the advent of Hider, the demo- 
cratic government of Germany felt itself forced into such tac- 
tics, which had baome common, and had led to Empire 
prefcrcnct in thc trade of the United Kingdom. The pre 
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viwsly amicable exchange of g d s  and services bcnvwr 
Germany and the small countries around her - SwitztrIand, 
Bdgium, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden - bt- 
came entangled. Thc fact that several of these countria joined 
the *'sterling arca" was repugnant to Gumany; her financiers 
were unable to explain why there was no "mark area" corres- 
ponding to 'kterling area." (Apparently, however, men as 
early as in the 'ao's, financial I e a h  in Gumany were plan- 
ning a "mark area.") Gradually exchange of particular mace- 
rials, raw or finished, or strvicts, came more and more under 
control. The Incunational Economic Conference of 1917 and 
various meetings held under the auspices of the League of 
Nations drew attention to tbis perversive &velopmcnt of in- 
terstate trade in Euroae. but all to no c h .  The world-wick 
depression of the 'p's .brought matters to a head in most 
countries, though differently in difiercnt cwntrits. 
At this juncture appcartd Hitlcr and the Nazi dgimc. It 
p d  to crate a "mark a m "  of new design. I t  originated 
and expanded ingenious mahods of barter, based on clearing 
funds. Minority pmurcs were cleverly conceded; pressure of 
numkrs w s  ostentatiously applied whcn ne~cssary. Gradu- 
ally the trade of Germany with every c o w  in Continad 
Europt lxgan to show the c f h  of German pcnmation, not 
mmdy into a country but dso in intcrfuencc in the mtations 
of foreign cwnuics with each other. It was perhaps the succcss 
of the "commercial wolution" after the advent of Hitltr that 
cnwuragd the Nazi party to undertake "military revolution" 
- disregard of the Tmty of Venailla, placing of tmps on 
the R h i n h d ,  fodcation of the border and expansion of 
thc budding of airplanes. WeArstRafr and KricgsschIlfr were 
joined. 
What has happened since the onset of war is the fulfhlment 
of undertaking cstablisbcd in the first five years of Nazi mle. 
Germany has sought to b e  the "center of Europe" - and 
the ratio of radius to drcumfuu~ce remains the same no mat- 
ter how short or long the radius. Germany strive not for 
quality but for rulership. Norway, h a r k ,  Haland, and 
Begiwn are imprisoned physidy,  exploited commcrciplly, 
&gradad culturally and obliterated politically. (When asked 
whether Germany would fed  the imprisoned populations, the 
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press replied with the question: since when has an invading 
army been cxpaaed to f e d  a country under oecupatian?) 
As Oucrlmd-rat, Germans are to k entitled to the highest 
standard of living ir Europe. Sweden and Switzerland arc 
isolated wmmcrcidly and compdd to work for Germany 
almost as much as the imprisoned muntries, with foreign 
recognition of thcir indcptndencc r e d u d  to a shadow. Spain 
star~cs while her would-be dictator chants tht mng of the 
"new order." Italy has the shadow of grea- but the sub 
stance of deprivation. The Balkan states find themselves sub- 
ordinated to a single market, that of Germany, and also draw 
thcir imports only from Germany or with German consent 
Everywhere is prtsslue on agriculture-to make Germany 
directly or i n d i d y  indepdcnt of supplies from overstas 
- and on de-iad~strialimtion~ -in order to d c  the Con- 
tinent of Europe dependent m Gcnnan @ and strvias, 
civilian and military. Such is the "new ordu." In protcst 
against innumerable wars, idealists have often pr& a 
federation of Continental Europe; on the Wcstun Coast, from 
Norway to Spain, the Nazis art making a dcmonstracion of 
their model. France and Spain have hardly morc autonomy 
than Narway and Holland. 
In the "new order," from the btginning Germany has becn 
invcntor and leader, Italy has followed ( v d d l y  morc than 
technically), Russia and Japan have become -rim, while 
the other nations of Western Europt from Norway to Spain 
have been forced into conscription. The central region from 
the Baltk to the Black Scar, the Danubian Area, has h e  
the Hintcdand of Germany (and Italy), with a forced export- 
ing agricultum recipmting a forced impomtion of indupr 
uid @,-inundated with propaganda on the delight9 of 
a b M  small s ~ t a  in the "new ordu." Beyond Eur~pc, in 
Asia and Africa, the countries arc re+ as fiefs; ahe stam 
d the Western Hemisphere is "dtfcncd to II later date." With 
her back to Russia, Gvmany is surrounded by fifteur coun- 
tries which arc all to be subrdinated to the mnomic and 
politid overlord in the cater. But anyone who hopes Russia 
might attack Germany from behind lacks d i s m .  OrMhrorrP 
can only wme from within Gemmy, so far as mmincnd 
Europe is concerned. 
I I 
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I Thc association of Stalin was inherent, but the stIcction of time was dif6cult for the public to understand. A p s a l  of Max Eastman's b k  Stdin's Ru~sia with the speeches of 
Hitler and the issues of the official p m  in Russia, will indi- [ are that at all timer dificrence. were in words md not in spirit. Incmldous, self-styled American liberals, who still  try 
to separate Hitler and Mussolini from Stalin, are urged to 
m d  in Eastman's h k  the chapter rntided "Smtin Beats 
Hider Twenty Ways." Gradually it has btcomc a parent that 
Stalin, Hitlcr, and Murrolini wc long-lost b r J m  laying 
hide and seek; while in the modern industrial aatt  o P Japan, 
mentalities amazingly similar to theirs have cvolvd from the 
p i s t m a  of oriental mysticism surrounding the Emperor. 
Judged in five-year periods, the changes in Germany since 
1 8 9  in her relations to other states of Europe, Sam in a ar- 
d n  m e  merely successive changes or misfomes,  natural 
enough. But when w e  compares the present Nazi attitude in 
all its ramifications with the frame of mind in Gcrrnany when 
Bismarck retired, it may fairly be said that in no half century 
of the modem world have deeper and more significant 
changcs cwurred within a p p f c  or over a people. 
Gemm Public Sentiment 
Finally Ihuc is h e  quwtion of change in German sentiment 
towards the outside world. From the conclusion of the France- 
Pmssian War to the outbreak of the Wodd War, Germany 
lived iq confident anticipation of a promising future. Ger- 
many had b m c  a unified country, in contrast to the century- 
old division into numerous small states. German trade ex- 
panded over the globc. Students from every part df the wodd, 
coming to Germany to study, carried back the influence of 
German technical standards. The r a p t  of the world for 
Germany rose with every decade. G c m y  had become a 
world power; even with such exaggerations as Bcr1in-t~ 
Bagdad, the half century before the World War was one of 
expanding cor~fidtnct in Germany and in her worth to the 
world, by herself and by thc world. 
Then came ddat in the World War and the Treaty of 
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Vtrsailles. Marry of us who were in Gntrd Empe during 
and following tbc World War, feared or believed that the 
expulsion of the HOUR of HohenzOlIcrn and the pardtion of 
Austria-Hungary were mistakes in policy for which Europe 
would some day pay a dreadful price. The late Professor 
Archibald CmIidge of Harvard resided in Vienna for a con- 
siduabIe puiod after the WorId War, and the above state 
ment represented his ok-t-repeatcd conviction, One of the faults 
of the Tmty of Vusailles was that it created many small 
stam, to the cconwnic disadvantage of Europe. In the '20's 
Germany pas& through an "economic liquidation" in the 
downward direaion, with repudiation of public and private 
debt, distortion of rural and urban relations. In fact, Germany 
in the 'ao's, though for d iIemt  reasons, y e d  through some 
such liquidation as America exptrienccd In the dtp&m of 
the '30'3. Thtst and other factors served to prevent Germany 
from working back to a normal-type peace, as did France 
alter 1871. 
It gradually &came dear that one of two things might 
h a p p :  either the German spirit wodd decIinc to the (ear- 
lier) level of a second-rank p p l e ,  or a "total German rr- 
volt" would in some way be organized. Either t h  Germans 
would lower their nationat self-respect €or a time, as they had 
done before, or they wodd recover it in a violent and per- 
versive form. Using a mixed metaphor, it might be said that 
in the 'zo's, thc seeds of Hitler were planted and came to har- 
vest in rhe '30'5 in the so-called Totalitarian Government of 
National Socialism. The Nazi elite k a m e  "brers  of a 
higher ethic." 
It was dl dong the ultimate intention of Russia to recover 
the pieces of western territory removed from her in the 
treaties following the World War; this was ammplirhtd by 
semi-force in the recovery of Latvia, Litbuania, Esthonia, and 
Bessarabia, and the larger part of what before the World War 
was calted Congress Poland. It used to be said of Austria- 
Hungary, that by the application of the old proverb "Di~idc 
et impma,'' mi-IawJess regions in the political sense baeamc 
mi-governed regions. But when the region was split into dis- 
tad fragments (Bulgaria, Roumania, Yugoslavia, Czachm 
slovakia, and Poland), with unmerited losses or gains of 
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I territory and consequent bittunas and impulst for revcngc, 
I this created a situation obviously made to ordcr €or a revived 
and rotalimrian Germany. It is impossible to bclicve that thc 
political policim of Hitler toward the East would have been 
I the same had Austria-Hungary lxen rerainad. There was an 
cxaggcratd revolt in Germany against the menace of what 
I during the negotiation of pace  in Paris was openly called the 
I 
I "Cordon Miiitairc"; the creation of buffer states to the East, 
cspecially Poland and Czechoslovakia, came to lx r r g d  as 
s "chain upon Germany.'* When Hitler coerced Czcchoslm 
vakia, he bribed Poland to military compliance by giving her 
a piece of territory stolen from Czechoslovakia, only to takt it 
back by force a few months later. 
In the reorganization of Gtrmany we may feel sure that the 
attitude of the House of Hoheazol~cm would have been dif- 
ferent from the messianic attitude of the paper-hanger from 
Austria ascended to dictatorship. In Germany, in contrast to 
the pcaccful ambitions of the pre-World War ptriod, we now 
have bitter, revengeful, terroristic ambitions of the Nazi d- 
gime. Evcry act includes two considerations: first, to make 
impsible  the dcfeat (or quality) of Germany in any field, 
tither military or economic, at any time in the future; and 
the impulse to take not merely revenge and reprisal but multi- 
plied revmgc and reprisal. This change from the famous 
"GmrurlicR~cic" to 4 ' f u ~ r  tcut01~icus'' represents one of the 
most extreme c h a p  within a people during a half century 
of history. The dreams of Russia, Japan, and the Axis Powers 
are for enforced autarky in enlarged areas, under exploitation 
and terror, T h e  German change in this direction is more 
marked than in the orher countries - a  modem feudab on 
the grand scale, mechanistic and btumEzed. The Naziclite 
arc cartel-batons and political overlords. 
There is a strain of mysticism in Teutonic b l d ,  extending 
into the Middle Ages; perhaps it originated in the wnquat 
of Rome by thc Huns. Strange signs of this mysticism art to 
bt noted in many placlp -in the writinga of Fichtc, HegcI 
I and Ninucbc, in thc views of Freduick the Gmt and Bir 
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marck, in the compositions of Richard Wagner. In tk days 
of scattered German states, it took thc form of the "dtstiny of 
Prussia" to consolidate all Teutonic branches into Pan-Gcr- 
manism; between PanJavism and Pan-Germanism arc both 
similarity and contrast. The cult of the Nibelungen in paint- 
ing, sculpture, song, and story during the last century has 
h of influence in this direction. The Nazi movement is 
filled with suggestions of mystical origins. The word "Fti Am" 
itsclf carries the meaning. The hypbthesis of "Nordic" cul- 
ture and purity of blood-"Once a German, always and 
everywhere a German," The combination of mysticism and 
ccnualized control of education of children represents to the 
outside world a scrious situation; when a virile and highly 
technical country teaches its children that they have an inborn 
destiny to rule others, thereby is created an underlying im- 
pulse to continuous war, Since the Renaissance several con- 
querors, most notably Napoleon Bonaparte, dreamed of au- 
thority over Europe; but it remained for Hitler, with che 
powers of thc industrial revolution, w plan a physical, racial, 
and social hegemony to cover Europe west of Russia and north 
of the Mediterranean -a new international order founded 
an international anarchy. As Keith Feiling has put it, Hider 
has rolled up the map of Europe, the M a p p  Mondi. 
Americans who have not lived abroad Iong enough and 
often enough to appmiate the contrast between the Germany 
of the present day and of the quarter century before the war, 
will find suficient opportunity for okrvation in the contrast 
baween the Germany and the United States of today. The 
inhabitants of Europn countries other than the Third Reich 
have both contrasts before them-the difference between 
Germany then and now and the current diffcrenfts bttwccn 
Germany and the ofher counuies, some independent but 
otkra under physical imprisonment or economic control. Five 
years ago the highly developed small countries of Europt I* 
prdcd themsdves in a senst as oases, favokd regions of 
higher development; imprisonmcnt. enslavement and 
nornic controI were inconceivable. Now four of these highly 
developed countries arc territorially and physically imprison- 
ed, the other two approach economic ~nslavernent, which will 
gravitate toward territorial surrender. It is not now to be 
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wandered at that the small European neighbors of the en- 
larged Reich arc forced to fee1 that in the event of German 
success in war it would lie within the power of Germany to 
sprmd her system of governmat more or tcss ovtr the entire 
world, certainly in the economic sense. The average American 
stands at such a distance that he is in no position to apply per- 
sonal mpcricnce to the question. 
It is a common error to assume that immigrants into the 
United Smm from any European country repicscntcd at any 
cime a cross-xedon of the wrrulation of thc Emwan country. 
lmmigracion from ~ u r o g  &IS not a mere indi&tion of Pr&- 
sure of population on resources. The venturesome migrated-- 
the n u g p ,  not the runcof-the-mine. It was mostly particular 
and not generic. This holds true of the largesalt Germaa 
immigration in the Iast half of the nineteenth century. In the 
'50's came many C;crmans disgusted with the outcome of the 
revoIution of 1848. With the o p i n g  of the Great Plains 
under the Homestead Act, many peasants from the sandy low- 
lands of North Germany tmk up virgin lands west of the 
Mississippi. Sailors deserted German ships to m a i n  in this 
country; in the ' ~ ' s  many m e  to the Pacific Coast, to enter 
into placer mining and timhring, often reverting to the sea- 
man's life in the coastal trade. Since 1900 many agents and 
clerks of German selling houses have mkm up citizenship; a 
history of the dweioprntnt of chunical industr in this coun- 
try will md how many chunists came to t I is country in 
order to take advantage of the beginnings of a new industry, 
The descendants of these various types are even more diverse 
than their forekrs. As a contrast, in Qucbae is a concentrated 
French population which has d i d a t a d  there for two 
cuttwries: but nothing of that sort occurred in the case of 
Gcman immigrants in this country, not even in the Uppr 
Mississippi Valley, w h e ~  the population of German and Scan- 
dinavian immigrants was large. 
T h e  real question concerns perhaps not so much the 
achieved technique of the totalitarian state as the p i b i l i t y  
of continuation df thc main-spring. Thc main-spring of the 
Nazi movement lics in controI of the education of children, 
female as well as rnalc-the inculcation of the spirit of sacri- 
fice for the sake of hc "destiny" of the "super-nation." So 
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long as opponents of Germany recognize faIlibility whtrtas 
Germans inculcate infallibility, the advantage of the struggle 
for the time being lies on the side of the Nazi movement. The 
impling revolurionary forces of Germany in the '30's arose 
from frustration of ambition, disillusion, disarganization of 
economy, desire for revenge, and medieval superstition in- 
corporated in adoration of the Nordic. Whether succcssivc 
generations of children can be kept in line for the "new order" 
represents the qucstian-mark of the future. On the continua- 
[ion of fanaticism in the German youth, or recovery of the 
traditional toleration, depends the intensity and duration of 
the totalitarian combat against other £oms of government in 
the world, Under current Hirlerian psychology, even a Pax 
Germokra would contain no Pax. brier or later - after war 
if not during war - the German mentality of today will have 
to square itself with the German mentality of a half century 
:go. "By clever, persistent propaganda," Hitler has remarked, 
even heaven can be represented to a people as hell, and the 
most wretched life as paradise." Germany must some day 
disprove his .  Three aIternatives arc possible: ( a )  restoration 
of independent stacts in Europe, ( 6 )  European Federation, or 
(c )  hegemony under Germany by force. Equality may be 
sought in the first two. The last means supremacy by Germany 
and subordination of all others. 
Freedom must br earned within, it cannot be i m p i d  from 
without. External freedom is  the response to internal, spiritual 
emancipation. Times change; before the industrial revolution, 
the hegemony of Germany in Europe would have meant 
largely external relations; now it would mean a tramforma- 
tion of E u r o p n  society,--to the innermost cdls and fibres. 
The imprisoned countries illustrate what is implied in Nazi 
control of Europ. Germany might succumb to ttchnica! col- 
lapse, w newly acquired superiority of mechanisms or eco- 
nomic isolation. But an endurin pee must indude f within Germany, the recovery o the spirit of quality and 
rejection of the ambition of dictatorship. Only Germans can 
recaptw the lm soul of Germany. 
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